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BEFORE BROWN:  REFLECTIONS ON 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND VISION* 
GENNA RAE MCNEIL** 
I am . . . concerned . . . that the Negro shall not be content simply 
with demanding a share in the existing system.  [H]is fundamental 
responsibility and historical challenge is . . . to make sure that the 
system which shall survive in the United States of America . . . shall 
be a system which guarantees justice and freedom for everyone. 
Charles Hamilton Houston1 
                                                          
 * This Essay is dedicated to the Honorable Damon J. Keith (Senior Judge, Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals), a conscientious, consistent, and courageous advocate of 
freedom, equality, racial justice, and human rights.  His brilliant and instructive 
opinions call this nation to the highest standards of a just society.  This essay is also 
dedicated to Pearl Lee Walker McNeil (Ph.D., 1979, American University), whose 
exemplary life of integrity, distinguished teaching, human rights advocacy, practical 
ecumenism, sacrifice, and love remains an inspiration. 
 ** Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, author of 
GROUNDWORK:  CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
(1983), co-editor with John Hope Franklin of AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (1995), and author of a forthcoming book-length study of State [of 
North Carolina] vs. Joan Little, 1974-1975.  This Essay is a revision of a paper presented 
as a panelist in the March 2003 symposium at the American University Washington 
College of Law, entitled “The Quest for Equal Opportunity:  Brown nears 50, San 
Antonio Turns 30.”  The author expresses appreciation to her fellow panelists.  Their 
presentations and responses to questions contributed to this published revision.  The 
author is especially indebted to Professor Isaiah Baker (Washington College of Law) 
and Carla Jean-McNeil Jackson, Esq. (former President of the Moot Court Board) for 
their careful and critical reading of the entire manuscript.  In addition to those 
authors cited—particularly Mary Frances Berry, Derrick Bell, Raymond Gavins and 
Colin Palmer—the author gratefully acknowledges the insights derived from the 
scholarship of and discussions with James Melvin Washington (1948-1997).  The 
comments of members of the symposium’s audience, especially Alonzo Smith 
(Research Historian, Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution) and 
Jesse Fenty (student, Washington College of Law) are also acknowledged with 
appreciation. 
 1. Audio tape:  Untitled (Dec. 1949) (on file with Charles Houston, Jr. and 
Mykola Kulish of Kinocraft, Inc.) [hereinafter Audio tape]. 
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I want to put myself out of business.  I want to get things to a point 
where there won’t be a National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People—just a National Association for the 
Advancement of People, period. 
Thurgood Marshall2 
  
On May 17, 1954 the Supreme Court declared racial segregation of 
public schools unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education3 and 
Bolling v. Sharpe.4  Responses, varying from jubilation to cautious 
optimism, arose throughout the land.  In New York, after processing 
the shock of a unanimous decision, the staff of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) were at first 
awe-stricken; then, they celebrated.  In the midst of the party at the 
LDF offices, Thurgood Marshall, the Director-Counsel and lead 
attorney for Brown, warned, “‘[Y]ou fools go ahead and have your 
fun . . . we ain’t begun to work yet.’”5 
In Nashville, Tennessee, a black girl walked down the street with a 
teacher from her segregated school.  That girl, Mary Frances Berry,6 
later recalled reading newspaper headlines announcing the Supreme 
Court ban on segregation and saying, “Look at this!  This is going to 
be great!  Starting next year the kids will all be going to school 
together!”7  Her teacher responded, “I’m not sure it’s going to 
happen quite next year.”8 
African Americans hoped that the 1954 school desegregation 
decisions would usher in a new era of integration and equal 
citizenship rights for black people in the United States.  As historian 
                                                          
 2. John Geiger, Mr. Civil Rights . . ., PITTSBURGH COURIER, May 29, 1954, at 13. 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Brown consolidated four cases from Kansas, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 
1951); Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 
103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952). 
 4. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  Bolling was a companion case to Brown that ruled on the 
constitutionality of racially segregated schools in the District of Columbia. 
 5. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:  A CIVIL RIGHTS 
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 71 (2001). 
 6. Mary Frances Berry is a Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania 
and a former chairperson of the United States Civil Rights Commission.  She is the 
author of numerous books on history, race and law, including BLACK RESISTANCE-
WHITE LAW:  A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA (1994) [hereinafter 
BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE-WHITE LAW] and THE PIG FARMER’S DAUGHTER AND OTHER 
TALES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE:  EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 
TO THE PRESENT (1999). 
 7. BRIAN LANKER, I DREAM A WORLD:  PORTRAITS OF BLACK WOMEN WHO CHANGED 
AMERICA 84 (1989). 
 8. Id. 
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John Semonche explained, the nation sought to distinguish itself 
from others—nearly two centuries before Brown—with charter 
documents that proclaimed an egalitarian “creed.”9  By the twentieth 
century, the language of the charter documents could be construed 
as a “civil theology,” or “a common faith” on which “American 
nationhood rests . . . [and which] promises fair, equal, and just 
treatment to all.”10  After framing their arguments for equality as 
“internal criticism of American society [that] is premised upon . . . 
calling attention to a discrepancy between belief and action,”11 
African Americans and their advocates hoped Brown would be the 
signal to close the gap between white and African American rights.  
The ruling seemed to affirm that the Constitution sided with those 
who believed that Thomas Jefferson’s words in the Declaration of 
Independence meant that “all human beings are created with equal 
rights that their fellow creatures should respect and that the 
government should protect.”12 
However, Brown initiated a new era of struggle in this nation’s 
history.  The era was marked by an expansion of activities pressing for 
greater civil rights for African Americans throughout the country.13  
Yet the massive resistance to desegregation disclosed an underlying 
truth.  Although both Brown and Bolling had far-reaching implications 
and consequences for race relations, they were silent on the deeper 
roots of the problems facing African Americans.  As Robert Carter, 
the NAACP’s First Assistant Special Counsel at the time, later 
recalled, “[f]ew in the country, black or white, understood in 1954 
that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that 
the real sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations is 
geared to the maintenance of white superiority.”14 
                                                          
 9. See JOHN SEMONCHE, KEEPING THE FAITH:  A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT 5 (1998) (arguing that the Court, in interpreting the Constitution 
and furthering the rule of law, has helped promote and shape both American 
identity and American unity). 
 10. Id. at 6. 
 11. Id. at 10. 
 12. See id. at 9 (interpreting the tenets of the Declaration of Independence). 
 13. See generally BETTYE COLLIER-THOMAS & V.P. FRANKLIN, MY SOUL IS A WITNESS 
(1999) (chronicling the era following the Brown decision and the expanded struggle 
for equal rights in education, public accommodations, athletics, voting, employment, 
and other areas). 
 14. Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 247 
(1968).  I concur with my esteemed colleague, Erwin Chemerinsky, who noted that a 
unanimous opinion in Brown would have been impossible if Justice Warren had 
insisted on acknowledging the immorality of segregation, as was declared in Loving v. 
Virginia.  In Loving, the Court held that the racially discriminatory statutes at issue 
had an “overriding purpose . . . [or] justification as measures designed to maintain 
White Supremacy.”  388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
MCNEIL.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/18/2003  2:00 PM 
1434 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1431 
The inescapable context of Brown and Bolling can be briefly 
summarized in four historical facts:  (1) the several decades of the 
Black Freedom Movement; (2) the emergence and articulation of an 
African-American jurisprudence within one period of that struggle in 
the first third of the twentieth century; (3) the persistent and 
prevailing Post-Reconstruction practice and ideology of white 
superiority, supported by violence and law; and (4) competing visions 
of a just, democratic society offered by dissenters active during the 
first half of the twentieth century.  Each fact had its advocates and 
adversaries and, over time, each shaped struggles and raised the 
stakes for the population.  Additionally, each significantly determined 
the meaning of Brown and Bolling for the United States of America 
and its diverse people. 
The history of the litigation campaign that led to the 1954 
decisions begins with the “active black struggle for freedom and 
justice.”15  That struggle began when Africans resisted at the point of 
capture, and continued as millions of Africans were forcibly removed 
from their homeland and shipped as cargo to the Americas.  Their 
struggle was ongoing and characterized by an oppressive/subordinate 
status in their relationship with white, European settlers.16  This 
ongoing movement of black struggle developed into, in the words of 
author Vincent Harding, “the most fundamental challenge to the 
social, economic, political, spiritual, or intellectual domination of 
white people and their power over black lives.”17  First and foremost, 
Brown and Bolling were, and are, part of the larger freedom struggle 
of people of African descent. 
The Black Freedom Movement, including the legal campaign 
culminating in the 1954 decisions, grew and continued because its 
participants were individuals, groups, and communities that believed 
in freedom, self-determination, equal entitlement to human rights 
                                                          
 15. See VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER:  THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN 
AMERICA xx (1981) (identifying struggle as the central theme of the black community 
in America). 
 16. See generally id. (documenting the history of the trade in Africans and the 
ongoing struggles of African Americans to overcome oppression).  For further 
reading on the slave trade and its aftermath in the United States, see MARY FRANCES 
BERRY & JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, LONG MEMORY:  THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 
(1982); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED MOSS, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:  A HISTORY 
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (7th ed. 2000); V.P. FRANKLIN, BLACK SELF-DETERMINATION:  A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN RESISTANCE (2d ed. 1992); DARLENE CLARK 
HINE ET AL., THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ODYSSEY (2000); JACQUELINE JONES ET AL., 
CREATED EQUAL:  A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2003); 
COLIN PALMER, PASSAGEWAYS:  AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA, VOLUME I:  
1619-1863 (1998); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 171-211 
(20th Anniversary ed. 1999). 
 17. HARDING, supra note 15, at xx. 
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and justice, and a struggle to change an oppressive nation.  
Particularly after World War II, the Black Freedom Movement 
became part of a global context.  Increasingly, people of color and 
others oppressed throughout the world advocated self-determination 
and opposed both colonialism and imperialism.  Among leaders and 
participants of the Black Freedom Movement were dissenters and 
visionaries.  As dissenters in American society, they did not simply 
react when confronted with racial oppression, but committed 
themselves to substantive change and transformation that fostered 
liberation.  They were persons with a vision of a society in which 
people could be free to fulfill their potential and realize their 
dreams, irrespective of race.  To make this vision a reality, some 
developed processes and strategies, while others articulated 
philosophies and worked to produce quality scholarship.  Edwin 
Gaustad aptly observed that “restraint and oppression frequently give 
dissent its cohesion and therefore its strength as a mass 
movement . . . [t]he dissenter is a powerful . . . engine in the service 
of a cause.”18 
In the second decade of the twentieth century, African Americans 
became more insistent in their demands for justice, while embracing 
and affirming a long-revered tradition of black protest.  Yet, as Colin 
Palmer argues, a new generation of African Americans engaged in a 
new style of protest that was “more vigorous, sustained, and 
multifaceted.”19  Under this new style of protest, James Weldon 
Johnson, the NAACP’s first executive secretary, transformed the 
NAACP into an unapologetic black rights organization.20 
At the dawn of the new century, the brilliant, Harvard-trained 
W.E.B. Du Bois presciently declared that, “the problem of the 
twentieth century is the problem of the color-line.”21  Du Bois’s 
prediction proved painfully true after World War I.  Many referred to 
the summer of 1919 as the “Red Summer,”22 which resulted in 
                                                          
 18. EDWIN GAUSTAD, DISSENT IN AMERICAN RELIGION 4 (1973). 
 19. COLIN PALMER, PASSAGEWAYS:  AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA, 
VOLUME II:  1863-1965 107 (1998). 
 20. Under Johnson’s leadership, the NAACP sponsored the dramatic “Silent 
Protest Parade” on July 28, 1917.  To the sound of muffled drums, ten thousand 
people marched down Fifth Avenue to protest racially-motivated violence by whites 
against black people.  The marchers carried banners that shouted beyond the drum 
beats:  “Your hands are full of blood,” and “Give me a chance to live.”  Id. at 106. 
 21. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1 (Gramercy Books 1994) (1903). 
 22. Following World War I, the United States was gripped by a perceived 
communist threat.  This coincided with severe repression of African Americans who 
increasingly asserted their calls for equal rights.  See generally WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR., 
RACE RIOT:  CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919 (1970). 
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approximately twenty-five anti-black riots.23  Mob violence in the form 
of anti-black riots began early in the century throughout the country, 
not merely in the deep South.  There were riots in 1900 and 1905 in 
New York, 1906 in Brownsville, Texas, and 1908 in Springfield, 
Illinois.24  Some of the most violent clashes occurred between 1917 
and 1923, when black fatalities reached into the hundreds, and 
injuries possibly into the thousands, as a result of rioting in Houston; 
East St. Louis; Washington, D.C.; Chicago; Omaha; Elaine, Arkansas; 
Tulsa; and elsewhere.25  In the face of continuing white violence, 
African Americans organized nationalist or radical collectives and 
unions, and armed for self-defense.26  Individuals and organizations 
pressed for anti-lynching legislation, and litigation through the courts 
increased and intensified.27  Ida B. Wells-Barnett, anti-lynching activist 
and author,28 joined members of the NAACP and the Equal Rights 
League in denunciation of riots, lynchings, and “legal lynchings.”29  In 
                                                          
 23. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 349; PALMER, supra note 19, at 120. 
 24. PALMER, supra note 19, at 118. 
 25. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 329-30, 344-52; see BERRY, BLACK 
RESISTANCE-WHITE LAW, supra note 6, at 108-25 (discussing white violence against 
blacks between 1917-1921 and the response of police, state authorities, and the 
federal government); see also C. Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591:  Florida Compensates 
Rosewood Victims and Their Families for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 503, 506-07 (1994) (discussing the 1923 annihilation of the predominantly 
black town of Rosewood, Florida, by a white mob from a neighboring village 
following a white woman’s accusation that an unidentified black male assaulted her).  
In addition to deaths from rioting, there were 364 lynchings during the years 1917-
1923.  AFRICANA:  THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AFRICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 1212 (Kwame Anthony Appiah & Henry Louis Gates eds., 1999). 
 26. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 341 (describing the development of 
black unions in reaction to the racism commonplace in white-controlled unions).  See 
generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, BLACK LIBERATION:  A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF 
BLACK IDEOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 137-79 (1995) (observing 
the rise in black populism, nationalism, and Pan-Africanism in the United States 
during the years 1918-1930, and outlining the drift toward Marxism that began in the 
1920s and continued in earnest in the 1930s).  Whether from radicalism or a mere 
desire to survive, African Americans increasingly responded to violent aggression 
with firearms.  See generally FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 346-52 (describing 
casualties in the riots that including white deaths from gunfire). 
 27. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 354-56 (documenting the NAACP’s 
post-World War I campaign against lynching and racial violence through the courts 
and through Congress). 
 28. See IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, SELECTED WORKS OF IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT (1991) 
(compiling important late nineteenth-century works by Wells-Barnett, including 
SOUTHERN HORRORS:  LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITS PHASES (1892); A RED RECORD:  
TABULATED STATISTICS AND ALLEGED CAUSES OF LYNCHINGS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1892-
1893-1894 (1895) [hereinafter A RED RECORD]). 
 29. See PATRICIA A. SCHECHTER, IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT AND AMERICAN REFORM, 
1880-1930 149-68 (documenting the influence that widespread violence against 
African Americans had in uniting the outspoken Wells-Barnett and more reserved 
groups like the NAACP).  See generally UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH:  LYNCHING IN THE 
SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997); DONALD GRANT, THE ANTI-LYNCHING 
MOVEMENT:  1883-1932 (1975); NAACP, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED 
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Moore v. Dempsey,30 the NAACP won a new trial for a poor black man 
convicted in the aftermath of the Elaine riots and secured a favorable 
ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court on the exclusion of African 
Americans from juries.31  The militant black nationalists and Marxists 
of the African Blood Brotherhood, through their publication, The 
Crusader, boldly demanded social change and called for black self-
defense.32  Black people, from poor urban dwellers and sharecroppers 
to politicians and poets, refused to sit idly by while attacked on 
multiple fronts.  They insisted on the value of black lives and pushed 
for freedom, inclusion, and recognition of equal rights.  However, 
they would not be rewarded with anti-lynching legislation, federal 
denunciation of second-class citizenship, an end to racial segregation, 
or legal protection against race-based economic discrimination in 
that decade, the 1920s, or the 1930s.  Racism, with a fierce intensity, 
exacerbated all the problems common to human relations and 
society; nevertheless the new generation was not deterred.33 
The images of people of color advocating for bold equal rights 
initiatives, promoting black nationalism, espousing Pan-Africanism, 
and fighting imperialism and colonialism in international arenas 
filled minds and fueled hearts of African Americans who began to see 
themselves culturally as a separate people and a nation within a 
nation.  W.E.B. Du Bois and more than a dozen other African 
Americans joined peoples of African descent in 1919 for a Pan-
African Congress, which met in Paris to consider Black self-
determination.34  Marcus Garvey sparked the imagination and 
commanded the loyalty of millions with his Universal Negro 
Improvement Association (UNIA).  The federal government used 
surveillance and repressive tactics against Garvey and the UNIA as 
well as labor organizations, socialists, communists, and other black 
groups denouncing persistent inequity and challenging the racist 
status quo.35 
                                                          
STATES:  1889-1918 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1919). 
 30. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
 31. Id. at 91-92. 
 32. ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, FREEDOM DREAMS:  THE BLACK RADICAL IMAGINATION 45-46 
(2002) (discussing the African Blood Brotherhood and its influence on the 
development of black radicalism). 
 33. For materials discussing the experiences of African Americans during World 
War I and through the 1920s, see sources cited supra note 16. 
 34. Nathanial Berman, Shadows:  Du Bois and the Colonial Prospect, 1925, 45 VILL. L. 
REV. 959, 961-62 (2000).  See generally DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS:  
BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1868-1919 535-80 (1993) (recounting the disheartening 
atmosphere for Du Bois and African Americans during and after World War I). 
 35. See generally JUDITH STEIN, THE WORLD OF MARCUS GARVEY:  RACE AND CLASS IN 
MODERN SOCIETY 186-208 (1991) (documenting the concerted efforts of the Justice 
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During the Great Depression and the New Deal era, the Black 
Freedom Movement continued unabated.  At the time, racial 
segregation and “Jim Crow” were firmly entrenched in the United 
States.  Segregation did not simply separate blacks and whites 
physically or legally; it encouraged whites to “assert and reiterate 
black inferiority with every word and gesture, in every aspect of both 
public and private life.”36  The African American community and 
national leaders in equal rights groups, women’s clubs, the Urban 
League, and other interracial formations assisted black people in 
handling both economic deprivation and the defense of their rights 
and humanity.  Vocal African American opponents of racism and 
injustice from across the ideological spectrum and across the nation 
worked with the masses, spoke to federal officials, challenged 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and experimented with radical 
alternatives in the struggle for equal rights and justice.37  Among 
African American voices for change, empowerment, and enlarging 
democracy were William Patterson; Paul Robeson; Angelo Herndon; 
Harry Haywood; clergymen Father Divine and Reverdy Ransom; 
Franklin Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet” members William Hastie and 
Mary McLeod Bethune; Congressman Arthur Mitchell; John P. Davis 
of the National Negro Congress; the coalition to defend the 
Scottsboro Boys (nine youths falsely accused of raping two white 
women in Alabama); gifted community organizers Ella Baker, Daisy 
                                                          
Department to harass and persecute Garvey and the UNIA).  Federal government 
concern over organized black protest was at its greatest where black organizations 
were thought to have collaborated with radical political or labor movements.  Id. at 
188; see TONY MARTIN, RACE FIRST:  THE IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUGGLES 
OF MARCUS GARVEY AND THE UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION (1976).  
Several texts provide enlightening discussions on the experiences of African 
Americans as well as the general citizenry in the post-World War I era before the 
Great Depression and New Deal.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16. 
 36. REMEMBERING JIM CROW:  AFRICAN AMERICANS TELL ABOUT THE SEGREGATED 
SOUTH 1 (William H. Chafe et al. eds., 2001); see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955) (reviewing the origins of “Jim Crow” and the 
development of racial segregation before and after the Supreme Court sanctioned 
such segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).  The term, “Jim Crow,” 
originated with the antebellum minstrelsy of Thomas Rice, who in black face 
mimicked black people as part of a performance entitled “Jump Jim Crow.”  Ronald 
L.F. Davis, Creating Jim Crow, available at http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/history/ 
creating2.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 37. See KELLEY, supra note 32, at 47-53 (recounting the growth of black radicalism 
and the rising interest of black intellectuals and celebrities—including Claude 
McKay, Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and Paul Robeson—in the anti-racist 
stances of the Communist party).  The Communist Party of the United States 
addressed the plight of African Americans in several ways, including founding a 
League of Struggle for Negro Rights and producing publications on black self-
determination.  Id. at 49-50. 
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Lampkin, and Juanita Jackson; club and church women’s leaders 
Mary Church Terrell and Nannie Helen Burroughs; union organizers 
A. Philip Randolph, Milton Webster, and Rosina Tucker; as well as 
Walter White and W.E.B. Du Bois.38 
The NAACP continued to work in the 1930s for anti-lynching 
legislation and litigate cases for black victims of the nation’s judicial 
system and laws.  Additionally, the NAACP actively opposed President 
Herbert Hoover’s nomination of a white supremacist judge, John 
Parker, to the federal bench.39  The Black Freedom Movement grew 
even as World War II intervened.  Not only did African Americans 
serve in the U.S. military, but they also criticized the nation that sent 
them to fight a war of liberation while failing to secure equal rights 
for its own citizens.40  During this time of war and Jim Crow, African 
Americans were creative, self-reliant, and ingenious in building their 
own lives and communities while struggling to survive in a hostile 
land.  They understood, as Gordon Blaine Hancock observed, that 
“the Negro had to do more than pull at his own bootstraps . . .   
minority groups should predicate their survival on strategy even as 
majorities based theirs on strength.”41  Grass-roots community 
organizer Ella Baker joined the NAACP in 1940, and through it 
infused the Black Freedom Movement with her philosophy of 
participatory democracy and her passion for black people’s 
empowerment in their local conditions.42  Interracial formations 
                                                          
 38. For profiles and narratives of other leading voices in the struggle during the 
1930s, see JERVIS ANDERSON, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH:  A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT (1973); 
M. MELINDA CHATEAUVERT, MARCHING TOGETHER:  WOMEN OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF 
SLEEPING CAR PORTERS (1998) (documenting the history of the Brotherhood’s Ladies 
Auxiliary); DARLENE CLARK HINE & KATHLEEN THOMPSON, A SHINING THREAD OF HOPE:  
THE HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 177-91, 261-62 (1998) (discussing the 
contributions of African American women through the women’s club movement, 
church movements, and the NAACP, including such individuals as Daisy Lampkin, 
Juanita Jackson, and Nannie Helen Burroughs); BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER & THE 
BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT:  A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC VISION 64-104 (2003) (tracing 
Baker’s radical development during the 1930s in Harlem). 
 39. See Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection & Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 
523, 541 (2002) (stating that the NAACP attacked Parker for the racist campaign 
speeches he made as the unsuccessful Republican candidate for governor of North 
Carolina in 1918). 
 40. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 438 (placing the number of African 
Americans serving in the military in World War II at approximately one million).  
Despite such service, the African American community was increasingly vocal about 
its inability to gain greater equality or share in the benefits of the war effort.  Id. at 
452-55.  Rising racial tension erupted into riots, with thirty-four deaths resulting from 
the 1943 Detroit riots.  Id. at 453. 
 41. RAYMOND GAVINS, THE PERILS AND PROSPECTS OF SOUTHERN BLACK LEADERSHIP 
71 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
 42. See RANSBY, supra note 38, at 105-47 (noting Baker’s tireless activities during 
the 1940s throughout the South on behalf of the NAACP).  Baker promoted broader 
inclusion of the African American community in political activity.  Id. 
MCNEIL.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/18/2003  2:00 PM 
1440 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1431 
across the political spectrum—from communists and socialists to the 
Congress of Racial Equality, and from the March on Washington 
Movement to the NAACP’s LDF—offered strategies to achieve 
freedom and equality.43 
During the Cold War, the dominant focus of the era was neither 
President Harry Truman’s desegregation of the military in 1948, nor 
the establishment of a national committee to study civil rights.44  
Rather, it centered on a domestic Cold War and the hysteria of 
McCarthyism that claimed both black and white victims.  Among 
those targets of repression were the gifted actor-singer-activist, Paul 
Robeson, and W.E.B. Du Bois, co-founder of the NAACP.  Although 
many African Americans—including Walter White, the Executive 
Secretary of the NAACP—distanced themselves from the Left, some 
Democrats and Independents—such as Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr., attorney George Crockett of the National Lawyers Guild, 
and Charles Houston—openly connected civil liberties with the anti-
racism work of the American Left.45  Going beyond protest and 
writing in the black press, African Americans litigated cases and even 
petitioned the United Nations to direct the nation’s and the world’s 
attention to the injustices of racial segregation in the United States.46  
                                                          
 43. See generally KELLEY, supra note 32 (surveying the intersection of the Black 
Freedom Movement, its organizations and leaders, with socialist and communist 
organizations and individuals).  Many African American leaders embraced—or at 
least came to terms with—socialist and communist ideologies from the 1930s 
onward.  See infra note 69; see also MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION 
20-32 (2d ed. 1991) (contrasting the African American community’s attraction to 
communism’s equality and anti-imperialism with its rejection of communism’s 
atheism and its policies during World War II). 
 44. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 16, at 461-62. 
 45. See MARABLE, supra note 43, at 27-31 (discussing problems experienced by 
Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois because of their political affiliations).  When Du 
Bois was indicted as an “agent of a foreign principal” in 1951, an international 
committee formed to defend the eighty-two year-old scholar-activist.  Id. at 27.  
However, Walter White asserted the government had proof of the charge, and the 
NAACP refused to assist Du Bois and others.  Id. at 28; see id. at 21 (describing the 
initial attraction communism held for A. Philip Randolph and Adam Clayton Powell, 
Jr., both vocal anti-communists after World War II); see also PALMER, supra note 19, at 
214-16 (summarizing the complicated position of Powell and others regarding World 
War II—fighting fascism abroad while denied equal rights at home—and 
communism, with its appealing egalitarian underpinnings).  See generally GERALD 
HORNE, BLACK AND RED:  W.E.B. DU BOIS AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE 
COLD WAR, 1944-1963 (1985); GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:  CHARLES HAMILTON 
HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 204-06, 214-15 (1983) [hereinafter 
MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK] (discussing Charles Houston’s defense of leftist and 
communist sympathies as natural reactions to racism in the United States).  But see 
generally Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 
(1988) (placing NAACP opposition to communism in the context of its role in 
fighting for desegregation, a role which required maintaining anti-communist allies). 
 46. See PALMER, supra note 19, at 216 (describing several petitions presented to 
the UN, including one presented by Charles Houston for the National Negro 
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These activities placed desegregation on the national agenda.  For 
many outside of the South, both inside and outside of the national 
government, desegregation was becoming an “imperative” of the 
Cold War.47 
In the first half of the twentieth century, black and white lawyers 
representing African Americans began to pursue their rights more 
aggressively through the judicial system.  The work of the national 
legal committee of the NAACP seemed to confirm the propriety of 
using the courts as a weapon in the Black Freedom Movement.48  
African Americans seemed able to use this public space to require 
whites to listen, especially when represented by white attorneys.49 
However, by the early 1930s, a gradual shift away from dependence 
on white attorneys for advocating blacks’ rights occurred as a result of 
the training of larger numbers of African American lawyers.50  Despite 
the prejudice that black attorneys understood they would face, 
Charles Houston and others were convinced that African American 
attorneys would most effectively represent black clients.  Discussing 
the need for Negro lawyers, Houston explained that “the average 
white lawyer, especially in the South, cannot be relied upon to wage 
an uncompromising fight for equal rights for Negroes. He has too 
many conflicting interests, and usually profit[ed] as an individual 
from the exploitation of the Negro, which he would be called upon 
to attack and destroy.”51  In contrast, black attorneys, facing the same 
                                                          
Congress and one by the NAACP).  Justice Marshall, along with NAACP leaders, 
feared that direct action or civil disobedience would lead to violence without 
achieving benefits.  MARABLE, supra note 43, at 25. 
 47. See Dudziak, supra note 45 (arguing that U.S. foreign policy concerns 
instigated integration to highlight the benefits of democracy over Soviet 
communism). 
 48. See generally CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP:  A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, VOLUME I:  1909-1920 (1967) 
(characterizing legal action as one of the central activities of the NAACP from its 
founding).  A “legal redress department” was created less than two years after the 
organization began.  Id. at 60.  Selected litigation was coordinated with lobbying for 
favorable legislation to remedy discrimination in education and public 
accommodations during the NAACP’s first decade.  Id. at 183-208. 
 49. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 
20 LAW & HISTORY REV. 97, 104-05 (2002) (describing the preference of the early 
NAACP for white attorneys because most elite schools were closed to blacks and 
because black attorneys faced more in-court obstacles as a result of their race). 
 50. See generally AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, Attorneys Black and White:  A 
Case Study of Race Relations Within the NAACP, in ALONG THE COLOR LINE:  
EXPLORATIONS IN THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 128 (1976) (describing the NAACP’s 
declining use of white attorneys, which began in the 1930s and continued as the 
organization grew in strength and achieved victories). 
 51. See Charles Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 49, 49 
(1935) (writing that white attorneys were unreliable because structural inequity 
meant that whites gained from racial discrimination). 
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discrimination as their clients, had an inevitable interest in, and a 
sustained commitment to, equal rights.52 
Thus, by the mid-1930s, a cadre of African American lawyers, at 
times joined by progressive whites, litigated to establish and enlarge 
freedoms while working within a framework that utilized the law to 
create social change.  This jurisprudence, later identified by J. Clay 
Smith, Jr. as “Houstonian Jurisprudence,” was grounded in an anti-
racist view of justice as fairness.53  While emphasizing fairness was not 
unique to philosophies of law in the United States, other frameworks 
did not necessarily entail the repudiation of white superiority or 
privilege.  Houston insisted that to ask “is it fair?” was to ask a 
question that required scrutiny of whether or not a person was able to 
function “without prejudice or bias operating against him . . .”54 
Taught inside and outside of the classrooms at Howard University 
Law School, Houstonian Jurisprudence affirmed three 
jurisprudential principles, variously articulated throughout Houston’s 
life:  (1) “law and constituted authority are supreme only as they 
cover the most humble and forgotten citizen”,55 (2) human beings are 
“equally entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” 
irrespective of differences in race, sex, national origin, or creed,56 and 
(3) that in a good society, the government “guarantees justice and 
freedom for everyone” while providing more opportunities and 
freedoms for succeeding generations without being hindered by 
prejudice.57  Integral to the implementation of Houstonian 
Jurisprudence was the idea of “Social Engineering,” which is a non-
traditional use of the law for social change rather than for strict 
                                                          
 52. See id. at 49, 51 (explaining that black lawyers were needed to serve the 
African American community as “interpreter[s] and proponent[s] of its rights and 
aspirations” and also as “social engineers”). 
 53. See J. Clay Smith, Jr., In Memoriam:  Professor Frank D. Reeves:  Towards a 
Houstonian School of Jurisprudence and the Study of Pure Legal Existence, 18 HOW. L.J. 1 
(1973).  In his article, Smith called on legal scholars to “fortify . . . the Houstonian 
thought process into a school of jurisprudence.”  Id. at 6 n.22.  See generally A 
Symposium on Charles Hamilton Houston, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589 (1993) [hereinafter 
Houston Symposium] (collecting memoirs of those who knew Houston and including 
discussions of the development of Houstonian Jurisprudence). 
 54. These words were inscribed by Charles Houston to his son, Charles, Jr., in a 
copy of Joshua Liebman’s Peace of Mind.  See William D. Bryant:  Oral History, in Houston 
Symposium, supra note 53, at 677, 682-85 (discussing the importance of impartial 
application of American law to Houstonian Jurisprudence). 
 55. Letter from Charles Houston to Stephen Early, White House Aide (Aug. 16, 
1933), quoted in MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 89. 
 56. Charles Houston, An Approach to Better Race Relations, Address at National 
YWCA Convention in New York, New York (May 5, 1934), available at 
www.law.cornell.edu/houston/ywcatxt.htm (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 57. Audio tape, supra note 1; see supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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reinforcement of the status quo.58  Social Engineering’s essential 
purpose was to use the law, particularly the Constitution, to advance 
the nation toward the realization of a society Houston envisioned as 
good for all, namely, one that provided justice and freedom for all its 
members.59  Social engineering required lawyers to advocate for the 
powerless and downtrodden as well as foster positive social change.60  
This required African American lawyers of the highest professional 
competence to work in the service of “group advancement” through 
experimentation with the law and constitutional interpretation, as 
well as carefully planned programs of litigation.61  Fundamental to 
Houston’s strategic thinking as a lawyer was his belief that Supreme 
Court justices and the majority of the American people viewed the 
written Constitution as the legal embodiment of the nation’s highest 
law and, as such, was a body of law to be interpreted more often than 
changed.  The consequence of this was, according to Houston, 
“inertia . . . against amendment.”62  Therefore lawyers were free to 
experiment in ways to force reforms that could not be accomplished 
through the political process.63 
In addition to the Black Freedom Movement and Houstonian 
Jurisprudence, race-based oppression—persistent, pernicious, and 
powerful—constituted a major shaping force in the lives and history 
of African Americans.  The ideology and practice of white supremacy 
played a key role in the birth not only of Brown and Bolling, but also 
the campaign of litigation of which they were the culmination.  The 
little girl in Nashville grew up and, as a mature scholar, stated this 
                                                          
 58. See Houston, supra note 51, at 51; see also Smith, supra note 53, at 6 n.22 
(stating that Houstonian use of the law was intended to procure “a pure legal 
existence” for African Americans); Herbert O. Reid, Introduction to Charles Hamilton 
Houston Commemorative Issue, 32 HOW L.J. 461, 461 (1989) (describing Houston’s 
development of a jurisprudence emphasizing use of the law in furthering social 
justice); Spottswood Robinson, III, No Tea for the Feeble:  Two Perspectives on Charles 
Hamilton Houston, 20 HOW. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1977) (describing Houston’s role as teacher 
and mentor in transforming Howard Law School in six years from an unaccredited 
night school to an accredited training ground for lawyers fighting racism).  See 
generally J. Clay Smith, Jr., Charles Hamilton Houston, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (1998). 
 59. Audio tape, supra note 1. 
 60. Charles Houston, Personal Observations on the Summary of Studies in Legal 
Education, Houston & Gardner Firm Papers (May 29, 1929) (quoted and discussed in 
MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 70). 
 61. See, e.g., Memorandum from Charles Houston, to the Joint Committee of the 
N.A.A.C.P. and the American Fund for Public Service [“AFPS”], Inc. (Oct. 26, 1934) 
[hereinafter Joint Committee Memorandum 1934] (detailing a proposal to spend all 
NAACP funds on litigation related to equal education and prioritizing the choices 
for litigation based upon anticipated success and subsequent benefits derived) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 62. Letter from Charles Houston to Monroe Berger (Feb. 10, 1948) (on file at 
Howard University, Moorland Spingarn Research Center). 
 63. Id. 
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clear and telling articulation of the third aspect of historical context 
for Brown and Bolling: 
Though the Bill of Rights, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment purport to protect individuals in their 
lives, liberties, and property, these ringing phrases have in fact 
afforded little protection to black people as a group.  Law and the 
Constitution in the United States have been a reflection of the will of the 
white majority that white people have, and shall keep, superior economic, 
political, social, and military power, while black people shall be the 
permanent mudsills of American society.64 
Seeing racial segregation and discrimination as fundamental 
challenges to freedom, justice, and equality, African Americans made 
the litigation campaign to abolish racial segregation in public 
education a priority.  The campaign became a priority despite the 
fact that African Americans lived under a national government that 
could not be depended upon for either the protection of its black 
citizens or affirmation of their equality under the law. 
What sustained African Americans, however, were “freedom 
dreams” of an infinite variety.65  In the case of those who had the 
talent to galvanize and organize communities, courage to commit 
their lives to social change, and stamina to support lives of struggle, 
the dream was a radical vision of a transformed society.  The architect 
of the litigation campaign that led to Brown and Bolling, Charles 
Hamilton Houston, maintained a similar vision.  Houston believed 
that African Americans should not strive only to achieve equality in 
the existing system, but to make the system one in which all people 
were guaranteed justice and freedom.66  Thurgood Marshall, 
Houston’s most famous student and his successor, envisioned a new 
United States of America in his own way.  “I want to get things to a 
point where there won’t be [an NAACP]—just a National Association 
for the Advancement of People,” he told a reporter from the 
Pittsburgh Courier.67  Marshall’s vision was of a society where 
individual merit and personal qualities mattered, not race.68  Others 
                                                          
 64. BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE-WHITE LAW, supra note 6, at xii (emphasis added). 
 65. See generally ROBERT MICHAEL FRANKLIN, LIBERATING VISIONS:  HUMAN 
FULFILLMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT (1990) (surveying 
the alternately religious and agnostic liberation theologies of Booker T. Washington, 
W.E.B. Du Bois, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King). 
 66. Audio tape, supra note 1. 
 67. Geiger, supra note 2. 
 68. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL:  AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 232 
(1998) (discussing Marshall’s desire for an integrated and color-blind society, even if 
historically black institutions were sacrificed in the process). 
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who struggled during the same era and after Houston’s death in 1950 
had different visions.69 
Financing for the first major litigation campaign against racial 
discrimination in education began during the Great Depression.  
During the Depression’s years of economic hardship, many blacks 
and a few whites committed themselves to the struggle for freedom 
and equal justice.70  This was a costly decision, but those who 
embarked upon this course of action believed the sacrifices 
worthwhile.  African Americans made financial contributions to the 
NAACP and to their own cases. Collections from churches, NAACP 
memberships, donations, contributions from sororities and 
fraternities, and offers of meals or a place to sleep for the lawyers 
sustained the protracted campaign. 
The first major infusion of capital for an organized series of cases 
came in 1930 from Charles Garland, a white philanthropist 
concerned about workers, poor people, and the problem of racial 
discrimination against the American Negro.  Garland offered the 
NAACP funds to support a legal approach to the alleviation of racial 
oppression from his American Fund for Public Service; otherwise 
known as the Garland Fund.71  Initially Garland offered the NAACP 
                                                          
 69. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS:  A SOLILOQUY ON 
VIEWING MY LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE IN ITS FIRST CENTURY 421-22 (1968) (“I believe 
in socialism.  I seek a world where the ideals of communism will triumph—to each 
according to his need, from each according to his ability.”); see also PAUL ROBESON, 
HERE I STAND 108 (1958) (“To be free—to walk the good American earth as equal 
citizens, to live without fear, to enjoy the fruits of our toil, to give our children every 
opportunity in life . . .”); RANSBY, supra note 38, at 372 (“The only society that can 
serve the needs of large masses of poor people is a Socialist society.”).  See generally A 
TESTAMENT OF HOPE:  THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (James 
Melvin Washington ed., 1986) (presenting King’s egalitarian and radical democratic 
views through his writings and speeches).  King’s vision of society rejected the idea 
that the needs of the individual and the needs of the community were inevitably in 
conflict, noting “[t]he good and just society is neither the thesis of capitalism nor the 
antithesis of Communism, but a socially conscious democracy which reconciles the 
truths of individualism and collectivism.”  FRANKLIN, supra note 65, at 124.  For more 
recent articulations of the Black Freedom vision, see the writings of Mary Frances 
Berry, Angela Y. Davis, Manning Marable, Leith Mullings, and Cornel West. 
 70. The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression revealed the 
paucity of concern for those victimized by racism in addition to poverty and 
joblessness.  Conditions of life for African Americans almost invariably included race-
based economic inequity.  This was exacerbated by the Depression, when the 
government tolerated discriminatory administration of relief and continued racially-
motivated violence.  See JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK NOW AGAINST THE DAY:  THE 
GENERATION BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 19 (1994) (describing 
the Depression’s harsher impact on the lowest rungs of society, which were also more 
deeply divided by race and class). 
 71. See Leland B. Ware, Setting the Stage for Brown:  The Development and 
Implementation of the NAACP’s School Desegregation Campaign, 1930-1950, 52 MERCER L. 
REV. 631, 638 (2001) (stating that Garland, scion of a wealthy Boston family, donated 
$800,000 to endow a fund to support radical causes); see also MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, 
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$100,000 to execute a planned attack on racial discrimination, 
though he later substantially reduced this amount.72  The NAACP and 
the Garland Fund formed a joint committee and used grant money to 
hire attorney Nathan Margold.73  Margold prepared a report for the 
joint committee proposing how best to use the funds.  Margold 
argued for a direct attack on segregation when irremediably 
accompanied by inequality and discrimination.74  In 1933, Margold 
resigned to accept the position of Solicitor for the U.S. Department 
of the Interior and was succeeded by Charles Hamilton Houston.75 
When the NAACP asked Houston to direct a litigation campaign 
against racial discrimination, he had already formulated specific views 
about the NAACP and the law—its authority, its uses, and its 
limitations.  Houston believed legal changes alone would have only a 
limited effect because these changes would not affect societal mores.76  
Another critical limitation of the law was the courts’ function as an 
extension of the status quo, particularly when the status quo in the 
United States subordinated black people.77  For Houston, this fully 
justified African American lawyers working as social engineers rather 
than as traditional practicing attorneys.78  However, by viewing the 
struggle as larger than the litigation, Houston emphasized the danger 
of heavy reliance on judges or other elected officials.  Houston 
reasoned that the nature of these positions meant that the officials 
deferred to the dominant classes who put them in power.79 
                                                          
supra note 45, at 113 (noting the public suspicion that Garland’s communist 
sympathies motivated his offer of funds). 
 72. See MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 115 (delineating the importance 
of strategy after Garland reduced the appropriation to ten thousand dollars as a 
result of the Depression). 
 73. See id. at 114-15. 
 74. See Nathan Margold, Preliminary Report to the Joint Committee Supervising the 
Expenditure of the 1930 Appropriation by the American Fund for Public Service to the 
N.A.A.C.P. 93 (1930) [hereinafter Margold Report] (arguing that the best use of 
resources was not attempts to force equal funding of racially segregated schools but 
to challenge segregation itself) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 75. MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL:  WARRIOR AT 
THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 67 (1992). 
 76. See MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 117 (discussing Houston’s belief 
that isolated legal victories were unimportant if not part of a larger strategic 
campaign with both legal and moral impact). 
 77. Audio tape, supra note 1; see Negro and Poor Whites Should Unite, clipping, ca. 
June 1934 (noting that blacks and poor whites should be allies but “have been 
poisoned against each other”), quoted in MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 102. 
 78. See DONALD NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP:  AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 115-16 (1991) (noting that under 
Houston’s direction, Howard University School of Law became the first public 
interest law program and offered the first civil rights law classes).  Former Houston 
student Oliver Hill explained:  “He kept hammering at us all those years that, as 
lawyers, we had to be social engineers or else we were parasites.”  Id. 
 79. Summary of Speech by Charles H. Houston to National Bar Association Convention, 
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Although aware that white violence made some hesitant to take 
direct action against racial oppression,80 Houston recognized that the 
struggle for equal rights in the United States required extra-legal 
means, such as demonstrations.81  Concerned about class and 
ideological issues that divided African Americans and the NAACP’s 
position, Houston argued that the NAACP must represent all African 
Americans and be committed to “[i]ntelligent leadership plus 
intelligent mass action.”82  Houston proposed not only “legal 
hand[i]work” but more public involvement.83  Beyond this, Houston 
brought to the campaign a particular understanding of the nature 
and pervasiveness of racial discrimination in the United States.  
Houston stated: 
[D]iscrimination in education is symbolic of all the . . . 
discriminations which Negroes suffer in American life. And these 
apparent senseless discriminations in education against Negroes 
have a very definite objective on the part of the ruling whites to 
curb the young [blacks] and prepare them to accept an inferior 
position in American life without protest or struggle.84 
Houston was the architect of the strategy that guided the litigation 
campaign of the NAACP to culmination in Brown and Bolling.  Several 
                                                          
Nashville, Tennessee, August 1, 1935: Proposed Legal Attacks on Educational Discrimination 
8 (Aug. 1, 1935) [hereinafter Legal Attacks] (“It is too much to expect the court to go 
against the established and crystallized social customs, when to do so would mean 
professional and political suicide.”) (on file with Administrative Files, NAACP 
Records at Library of Congress).  Persuaded by elements of radical thought and his 
own research, Houston was beginning to develop a class analysis and also joined 
those who called for the unity of blacks with poor, working-class whites.  Id.; see also 
KELLEY, supra note 32, at 36-59; MARABLE, supra note 43, at 10-11 & 21 (describing 
racial violence after World War I as influenced in part by the desire to preserve the 
socio-economic order and maintain an African American underclass). 
 80. See MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 96-97 (discussing Houston’s view 
that the failure of the United States to prevent lynchings had international 
implications).  Houston asserted that the prevailing mood of “disillusionment and 
distress” among African Americans as a result of such violence could lead to 
widespread defections and disloyalty.  Id. 
 81. See Legal Attacks, supra note 79, at 8 (suggesting that “strikes, picketing, 
protests, demonstrations, and public appeals” must necessarily augment the legal 
battles in order for the struggle for equal rights to succeed); Charles Houston, 
Extracts From the Statement of Charles H. Houston in Debate with Bernard Ades, 
Before the Liberal Club of Howard University, on The Scottsboro Case (Mar. 28, 
1935) (announcing the rising African American awareness of “the possibilities and 
tactics of mass pressure”), quoted in MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 120. 
 82. Charles Houston, Address at NAACP Annual Conference (July 2, 1933) 
(transcript available at 1933 folder, Annual Conference Files, NAACP Records, 
Library of Congress) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 83. Memorandum from Charles Houston to the Joint Committee of the 
American Fund for Public Service, Inc. and the NAACP (Nov. 14, 1935) [hereinafter 
Joint Committee Memorandum 1935] (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 84. Legal Attacks, supra note 79, at 2. 
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scholars, however, have challenged the historical significance of 
Houston’s role as an architect-strategist of the NAACP’s litigation 
campaign.  Some argue that before the late 1940s, LDF attorneys 
followed the text of “the Margold Bible.”85  Others contend that the 
NAACP employed an indirect approach as a way of biding time until 
its lawyers could implement the direct approach originally proposed 
by Margold.86  Still others suggest that Houston’s strategic gradualism 
and use of an indirect approach became the modus operandi as a 
second choice to a more ambitious strategy because the organization 
lacked the necessary resources.87 
Legal scholar Mark Tushnet’s work denies that Houston was the 
architect of a strategically planned campaign of litigation, arguing 
that Houston was “responsive more to the demands of the moment 
than to those of the plan.”88  According to this argument, after 
responding to particular situations as they arose, Houston would 
construct a plan in hindsight.89  Such an interpretation, however, is 
not only at variance with the recollections and assessments of 
Houston’s contemporaries, but is also an analysis that rests upon an 
inappropriately narrow conception of strategy.90  This interpretation 
underestimates not only Houston’s confidence in Marshall’s 
comprehension and commitment to the strategy, but also the 
                                                          
 85. See, e.g., ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND:  A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 11 (1990) (suggesting a transition directly from the Margold plan 
to a strategy designed by Thurgood Marshall, without mention of Houston). 
 86. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 136-37 (1977) (arguing that 
Houston believed white attorneys would not have the requisite drive to maintain a 
litigation campaign, thus requiring the training of black attorneys). 
 87. See NIEMAN, supra note 78, at 136 (arguing that a lack of funds led to a 
decision to attack segregation more peripherally by initially focusing on the 
requirement of equality in “separate but equal”). 
 88. MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 35 (1987). 
 89. Id.  But see Mark Tushnet, Brown v. Board of Education, in RACE ON TRIAL 
160, 164 (Annette Gordon-Reed ed., 2002) (presenting a more generous account of 
Houston’s strategic role without acknowledging any modification of previously held 
views based on new sources).  The statements regarding Houston’s ex post facto 
identification of strategy would seem to represent Tushnet’s most detailed discussion 
of NAACP strategy during the Houston period. 
 90. See William Henry Hastie, Charles Hamilton Houston, 1895-1950,  35 J. OF 
NEGRO HISTORY 355, 356 (1950) (“[Houston] was the architect and the dominant 
force of the legal program of [the NAACP].”); Thurgood Marshall, College Honors 
Charles Houston ‘15, AMHERST MAGAZINE (1978), reprinted in THURGOOD MARSHALL:  
HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 272, 272 (Mark V. 
Tushnet ed., 2001) (“[Houston] was the engineer of all of it.”); Oliver Hill, Sr.:  Oral 
History, in Houston Symposium, supra note 53, at 659, 669 (“Charles Hamilton Houston 
was the architect of the legal strategy.”).  See generally Robinson, note 58. 
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regularity with which the two communicated regarding the litigation 
campaign as a protracted struggle.91 
LDF lawyers and others spoke of the general design for the 
litigation campaign and discussed the various adaptations executed 
prior to 1952.  Marshall, Robert Carter, and others engaged in 
discussions and debates concerning the appropriate timing and 
approach.  All of this occurred within the context of a litigation 
campaign conceived as part of a movement.92  Accordingly, as long as 
the campaign sustained an over-arching objective of dismantling 
Plessy v. Ferguson,93 broad flexibility and responsiveness to the 
concerns of communities were not counter-strategic.  Houston relied 
upon his legal expertise to establish not only model procedures, but 
also criteria for cases chosen by the national office to litigate and 
challenge elements of inequality.  In light of limited resources, the 
cases had to have sufficiently strong records and clients to secure 
certification for argument before the Supreme Court.94  Houston, 
Marshall, and other staff members understood that each case must 
materially contribute to the dismantling of Plessy.  Houston, however, 
understood that both variations in community involvement and lively 
discourse about tactics, as well as timing, signaled vitality in social 
movements.  Documentary evidence confirms that in 1934 and 1935 
Houston mapped out a litigation campaign characterized by a broad 
strategy with the ultimate aim of ending segregation.95 
Houston’s leadership and administrative style simultaneously 
demanded excellence in case preparation and accountability to 
clients, the larger communities in which they lived, and to African 
Americans as a group.  Houston never considered the task as 
anything less than the collective struggle of both African American 
communities and committed African American attorneys serving as 
                                                          
 91. See WILLIAMS, supra note 68, at 181-84 (discussing Marshall and Houston’s 
shared ideas about strategy, a collaboration that continued from the time Marshall 
succeeded his mentor until Houston’s death in 1950). 
 92. See id. at 94, 100 (observing Houston’s desire that the movement be self-
perpetuating and not dependent on any one person, such that Marshall and his 
colleagues could successfully take over and lead). 
 93. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana law that permitted segregated 
accommodations on passenger trains).  This ruling served as the precedent 
supporting segregation for the first half of the twentieth century. 
 94. See Oliver Hill, Sr.:  Oral History, in Houston Symposium, supra note 53, at 659, 
670-71 (discussing the preparation of cases and concerns regarding the strength of 
the merits). 
 95. See MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 116 (outlining Houston’s strategy 
of attacking unequal apportionment without conceding to segregation, a strategy at 
odds with Margold’s full assault on segregation).  See generally Legal Attacks, supra note 
79 (presenting Houston’s multifaceted plan of attack seeking maximum results from 
the NAACP’s limited resources). 
MCNEIL.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/18/2003  2:00 PM 
1450 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1431 
social engineers.96  Community leaders—editors, journalists, teachers, 
clergy, entrepreneurs, politicians, attorneys, impatient youth—
brought cases dealing with educational inequality to the attention of 
the NAACP.  They identified concerns that ranged from the absence 
of tax-supported graduate or professional educational opportunities, 
to unequal appropriations and facilities, to differentials in teachers’ 
salaries.  Scores of lawyers of national reputation, such as William 
Henry Hastie and Robert Ming, cooperated or formally affiliated 
themselves with the NAACP’s National Lawyers Committee and staff, 
as did local lawyers, who took great risks to wage battle in their own 
localities.  Although the staff grew in the 1940s, Houston, Marshall, 
and Carter provided essential leadership.97  A cadre of dedicated and 
courageous lawyers associated with the NAACP and its Legal Defense 
Fund, some trained by Houston, such as Marshall—who succeeded 
Houston as Special Counsel98—Oliver Hill, William Bryant, and many 
others skillfully argued racial discrimination cases over several years 
before the Supreme Court handed down its rulings in Brown and 
Bolling.99 
In 1935, when Houston moved to New York, he became the 
NAACP’s first full-time salaried Special Counsel, with particular 
responsibility for the campaign against discrimination in education.100  
Houston envisioned the campaign as one to abolish racial 
segregation in public education gradually.  Houston planned the 
campaign as a protracted struggle that incorporated both a series of 
cases and an expression of the will of communities to fight for their 
                                                          
 96. See MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 133 (noting the direction 
Houston provided to other lawyers and the inspiration his efforts offered to those 
litigating against discrimination in other arenas). 
 97. See Darlene Clark Hine, Black Lawyers and the Struggle for Constitutional Change, 
in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33, 45 (John Hope Franklin & 
Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995) (noting Houston’s de-emphasis of himself as lead 
counsel to neutralize efforts to discredit the NAACP by bringing disbarment 
proceedings against him).  See generally Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button:  Legal 
Ethics and the NAACP [Part II], 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 296-99 (2001) 
(discussing Houston’s awareness and concern that those hostile to the NAACP would 
use the rules of legal ethics to attack the organization, necessitating a high level of 
client care). 
 98. See DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 75, at 103 (describing Marshall and Houston’s 
complementary strengths and their ability to work as a team); see also WILLIAMS, supra 
note 68, at 100 (describing Marshall’s apprehension in taking over Houston’s 
position at the NAACP). 
 99. See generally MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at chs. 10, 12, 13 (stating 
that others involved in the litigation who benefited from Houston’s consultation and 
advice included Spottswood Robinson III, Louis Redding, Edward Lovett, Sidney 
Redmond, Robert Carter, James Nabrit, Jr., George E.C. Hayes, Z. Alexander Looby, 
Constance Baker Motley, and Jack Greenberg). 
 100. See id. at 132. 
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own freedom, justice, and equality.  The strategy’s aim, the total 
elimination of segregation, was to gradually dismantle the Plessy 
precedent through the establishment of new decisions on the 
definition of equality in education.101  The dismantling of the Plessy 
precedent took priority over all else, despite Houston’s concerns over 
education in mixed as well as segregated school settings.  Houston 
argued that “education is preparation for the competition of life” and 
a poor education handicaps an individual in that competition.102  
Houston’s plan could hardly have differed more from Margold’s. 
Charles Houston was nonetheless unwavering in his belief that stare 
decisis,103 judicial self-restraint, the step-by-step process of the Court, 
the practical absence of a tradition for racial equality in the United 
States, and the pervasiveness of white superiority demanded this 
strategy.104  Houston’s research and strategic interest in presenting 
judges with cases concerning the inequality of law school education 
confirmed the necessity of making professional and graduate 
education a priority.105  Taxing blacks “to educate the future white 
leaders who are supposed to rule over [blacks]” was unacceptable, 
Houston argued, adding “[w]e must break this up or perish.”106 
                                                          
 101. See id. at 134 (describing Houston’s belief that if inequality in education was 
not remedied, African Americans would be perpetually economically disadvantaged). 
 102. Charles H. Houston, “Tentative Statement Concerning Policy of N.A.A.C.P. 
in its Program of Attacks on Educational Discrimination,” (July 12, 1935), quoted in 
MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 132. 
 103. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis as the 
process by which the court is committed to following its precedents unless 
compelled—by new facts, issues of law, or arguments—to a reinterpretation more 
consistent with constitutional requirements); see also SEMONCHE, supra note 9, at 10-11 
(noting that final decisions of law are resolved by a Supreme Court that judges in 
light of the standard of a “holy writ,” the Constitution).  The Supreme Court is 
reserved the role of “supreme priestly interpreter of the Constitution,” and its 
Justices “must enter into dialogue with the past . . . as they rationalize their 
decisions.”  Id. at 11. 
 104. Houston initially proposed beginning with elementary schools and the 
unequal apportionment of funds in de jure racially segregated systems of the Deep 
South.  See Joint Committee Memorandum 1934, supra note 61.  He proposed 
consideration of discrimination in transportation as it affected rural students’ 
attendance of public schools, differentials in teachers’ salaries and programs of state 
universities.  The reduction in funds, however, prompted his rethinking of these 
multiple priorities.  Id. 
 105. In 1935, only two out of nineteen de jure segregated states had state-supported 
institutions of higher learning accessible to blacks.  Legal Attacks, supra note 79, at 5.  
Included in the segregated states was Maryland, which offered out-of-state 
scholarships.  Thurgood Marshall, later joined by Houston, successfully challenged 
the segregated University of Maryland Law School on behalf of black applicant 
Donald G. Murray.  See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936) (ruling that Murray 
had a right to be admitted to University of Maryland Law School). 
 106. Legal Attacks, supra note 79, at 5. 
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During 1935 and most of 1936, the Special Counsel set policies, 
refined the plan, addressed the wider public, and litigated.107  In the 
autumn of 1936, Houston added one of his most talented students, 
Thurgood Marshall, to the legal staff.  Together, until Houston’s 
retirement in 1940, with Marshall as Assistant Special Counsel and 
Houston as Special Counsel, these lawyers collaborated with local 
attorneys and communities to inaugurate the legal campaign.108  Even 
after retirement, Houston would remain a consistent and accessible 
adviser and consulting attorney until his death in 1950.109  After 
Houston’s death, Marshall became Special Counsel for the LDF.  
Marshall modified Houston’s basic strategy and long-range plan.110  In 
1950, after establishing new precedents to reverse Plessy,111 LDF 
proceeded with its direct attack on segregation.112  In 1952 and 1953, 
the Supreme Court heard the arguments of the NAACP and the LDF 
which led, four years after Houston’s death, to its decision in Brown.113 
The litigation journey to Brown can be tracked from 1938 to 1950 
in the following cases:  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,114 Sipuel v. 
Oklahoma State Board of Regents,115 Sweatt v. Painter,116 and McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents of Higher Education.117  The 1938 decision of the 
Supreme Court in Gaines marked the first successful attack on the 
Plessy precedent.  Houston, Marshall and Sidney Redmond of St. 
                                                          
 107. The plan included developing strategy, “positionary tactics,” criteria for test 
case litigants, and model procedures for test cases.  See id. at 3-4 (acknowledging that 
limited resources dictated employing such devices for maximum effect). 
 108. Houston moved his base of operations to Washington, D.C. in 1938, thus 
shifting a greater number of tasks to Marshall even before Houston’s formal 
resignation in 1940.  WILLIAMS, supra note 68, at 99-105. 
 109. See generally MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 176-212 (documenting 
Houston’s career years in private practice, during which he remained heavily 
involved in the NAACP’s fight for equal rights for African Americans). 
 110. Thurgood Marshall:  Oral History, in Houston Symposium, supra note 53, at 625, 
634. 
 111. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Okla. State Bd. of Regents, 
332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 112. See Thurgood Marshall:  Oral History, in Houston Symposium, supra note 53, at 
625, 635-38 (outlining the effort by the LDF to make direct attacks on segregated 
housing, transportation, public facilities, employment, and education); see also 
RANDALL BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW:  THE LEGAL CAREER OF JUSTICE 
THURGOOD MARSHALL 70 (1973) (recalling that Marshall decided to continue the 
direct attack against segregation with Brown because recent desegregation in higher 
education cases suggested that schools adjusted to desegregation somewhat easily). 
 113. See PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 38-40 (detailing the history of oral arguments 
that led to the Brown decision and noting that the Supreme Court delayed the 
process by calling for a rehearing in December 1952). 
 114. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 115. 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
 116. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 117. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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Louis, Missouri, prepared the suit of Lloyd Gaines, who sought 
admission to the law school of the University of Missouri.  On appeal, 
the NAACP attorneys won a new interpretation of Plessy, with the 
Supreme Court ruling that Gaines had a right to a legal education in 
Missouri equivalent to that afforded white citizens.118  This ruling 
became an essential precedent on which the NAACP relied as it 
struggled to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating segregated 
public education. 
Following the decision, the LDF intensified its casework on racial 
discrimination and higher education.  Increasingly, advocates of 
freedom and opponents of oppression were linking their struggles to 
one another.  African Americans found it logical and strategic to 
portray the Black Freedom Movement as inextricably bound to other 
freedom movements; while also emphasizing its goals as consistent 
with those promoted by the United States in its Cold War foreign 
policy.  Civil rights advocates inside and outside the NAACP and the 
LDF took advantage of the concern of some Americans, including a 
few policymakers and politicians, about the nation’s image as a racist, 
repressive government in the midst of the Cold War.  In the 1948 
Sipuel decision regarding state-supported legal education for Ada L. 
Sipuel and the 1950 rulings in Sweatt and McLaurin, the Supreme 
Court further outlined its post-war interpretations of equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Sipuel, the justices declared 
that legal education provided by the state must be made available to 
blacks as well as “applicants of any other group.”119  This meant, 
however, that establishing a segregated state-supported law school for 
blacks in Oklahoma was constitutionally permissible. 
In 1950, NAACP and LDF lawyers were already in consultation with 
local lawyers, teachers, parents, and children who were anxious to 
press public grade school cases in their states.  The LDF assured itself 
of additional precedents establishing tangible and intangible 
requirements for equality in education through the litigation of 
Sweatt and McLaurin.120 The Court agreed with the LDF that state-
supported education should employ equal protection beyond 
facilities, resources, or even restrictive admission to programs of 
higher education established for whites.121  The justices found that the 
separate law school for Negroes established by Texas was inferior to 
                                                          
 118. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352. 
 119. Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 633. 
 120. See KLUGER, supra note 86, at 260-69.  See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS 
IN THE COURTS 64-86 (1994) (recounting the legal victories in Sweatt and McLaurin 
and the subsequently changed atmosphere for bringing school segregation cases). 
 121. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634-35. 
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the University of Texas Law School not only with respect to faculty, 
library, accreditation, and alumnae, but also with respect to qualities 
that cannot be measured objectively, but are nonetheless 
important.122  The justices felt compelled to admit that a law school 
was ineffective “in isolation from the individuals and institutions with 
which the law interacts.”123  Following the reasoning of Sweatt, the 
Court decided in favor of the plaintiff, G.W. McLaurin, a doctoral 
candidate at the University of Oklahoma.  The Court ruled that it was 
constitutionally impermissible to admit McLaurin and then segregate 
him from other students in the graduate school of education.124  The 
Court clarified that “such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to 
study, to engage in discussions, exchange views with other students, 
and, in general, learn his profession.”125  In Sweatt and McLaurin, the 
Court held that inequality and racial discrimination, as either 
separate and unequal treatment, facilities, and conditions, or as 
unequal treatment within the majority’s state institution, violated 
standards set in Plessy.126 
By 1950, the groundwork for a direct attack on segregated public 
education had been laid.  Primary and secondary education, long 
recognized as critically important, became the focus and the initiative 
of lawyers and black communities in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia, and 
South Carolina.127  After hearing oral arguments in 1952 and re-
arguments in 1953, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Brown on May 17, 1954.  In Brown, the nine Justices unanimously held 
that dual systems in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina 
deprived the plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, of equal 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 634.  The Justices discussed specifically other measures of inequality.  
They noted faculty reputation and experience, alumni status and standing, and 
tradition.  Just as Marshall—and Houston before him—had hoped, the Justices easily 
saw intangibles of equality as related to professional training in their own field.  Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). 
 125. Id.  The Justices added that removal of restrictions imposed by the state of 
Oklahoma “will not necessarily abate individual and group predilections, prejudices 
and choices.  But at the very least that state will not be depriving the appellant of the 
opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own merits.”  Id. at 
641-42. 
 126. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635-36 (ruling that when the state failed to provide an 
African American resident with a separate education equal to that provided to white 
residents, it was required to provide that education in the facility formerly reserved 
for whites); McLaurin, 339 U.S. 642 (ruling that a black student admitted to a 
previously segregated school “must receive the same treatment at the hands of the 
state as students of other races”). 
 127. See Joint Committee Memorandum 1934, supra note 61 (identifying unequal 
apportionment of funds to schools and the need to address flagrant cases of 
discrimination). 
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protection under the 14th Amendment.128  The Court clearly stated 
that the separate but equal doctrine should not exist in education 
because separate facilities are “inherently unequal.”129  Additionally, 
in Bolling, the Court stated that “it would be unthinkable that the 
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government.”130  The unanimous Court then held that the racial 
segregation imposed on children in the public schools of 
Washington, D.C. was an arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation 
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.131 
The decision in Brown initiated massive resistance—from mob 
violence to the Southern Manifesto.132  The resistance was 
undoubtedly a consideration when the Court decided to delay the 
implementation of desegregation in the remedy phase of Brown v. 
Board of Education (Brown II).133  Thus, in light of the irrepressible anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist struggles of people of color throughout 
the world, which were intensifying while lawyers were developing 
Brown and Bolling, these 1954 decisions could be seen as modest 
responses to the struggle of blacks in the United States.134  
Furthermore, it is important to note that while the Supreme Court 
upheld the plaintiff’s right to equal protection in Gaines, it also 
affirmed a principal that would later become problematic for African 
Americans victimized as a group by systemic institutionalized racism.  
Specifically, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes stressed the personal 
and individual nature of the constitutional right to equal 
protection.135  Although African Americans suffered, and continue to 
suffer, as a group from institutionalized racism and white supremacy, 
the Supreme Court did not choose to comment on the societal 
                                                          
 128. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 129. Id. 
 130. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 98-99 (defining the Southern Manifesto as the 
South’s unified statement of resistance to desegregation, one of several steps taken 
by segregationists to oppose reform).  The Manifesto, signed by most southern 
members of Congress, accused the Court of abusing its power and made its stated 
goal the reversal of Brown and the prevention of desegregation.  Id. 
 133. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 134. See, e.g., Charles Houston’s Defense, AFRO-AMERICAN, Feb. 1, 1947, at 8 (“[The] 
disenfranchisement of colored people in the South is just as much an international 
issue as the question of free elections in Poland, or the denial of democratic rights in 
Franco Spain”), quoted in MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK, supra note 45, at 198; see also 
generally A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to minorities in the case of 
Citizens of Negro descent in the United States of America and an appeal to the 
United Nations for redress prepared for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People under the Editorial Supervision of W. E. Burghardt 
Du Bois (1947) (copy on file with the American University Law Review). 
 135. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938). 
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implications because the Court interpreted the Constitution as a 
document fundamentally concerned with individual rights.136  Despite 
the progress created by the Brown decision, the Court slowed the pace 
of reform by sanctioning delays in righting the wrongs against 
individual African Americans who had been injured by racial 
segregation in education. 
By the time of Regents of University of California v. Bakke,137 some 
Supreme Court justices began to give short shrift to the historic 
context and origin of the Equal Protection Clause by applying the 
individual rights interpretation to dismantle affirmative action 
remedies and uphold white privilege.  In Bakke, the Court affirmed a 
California Supreme Court ruling that the special admissions program 
at the University of California-Davis Medical School was unlawful and 
the white petitioner should be admitted.138  In dissent, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall asserted that affirmative action programs are a 
necessary component of bringing blacks into mainstream America 
after 200 years of suffering.139 
Subsequent to Bakke, the Court in Richmond v. J.A. Croson ruled on 
Richmond’s plan requiring city contractors to award certain contracts 
to minorities.140  The Court held that the city failed to demonstrate a 
compelling governmental interest justifying the plan, and that plan 
was not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior discrimination.141  
In Shaw v. Reno, the Court struck down a North Carolina voter 
redistricting plan intended to strengthen minority representation.142  
The Court believed the resulting irregular districts were designed 
solely as “an effort to separate voters into different districts on the 
basis of race.”143 
Significantly, the color-blind theory as articulated by O’Connor in 
Croson and Reno—created to oppose race-conscious remedies to 
centuries of institutionalized racism and white supremacy—has wide 
currency.144  See Criticisms of race-conscious remedies have centered 
                                                          
 136. Id.; see SEMONCHE, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that the Supreme Court is the 
governmental body assigned the duty to respond to the claims of individuals whose 
constitutional rights have been abridged). 
 137. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 138. Id. at 320. 
 139. Id. at 387. 
 140. 488 U.S. 476 (1989). 
 141. Id. at 505-07. 
 142. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 143. Id. at 649. 
 144. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (“[Richmond], has at its disposal a whole array of 
race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to 
small entrepreneurs of all races.”) (O’Connor, J.); Reno, 509 U.S. at 657 (“Racial 
classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society) (O’Connor, J.). 
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on the rhetoric of egalitarian ideals, but can also be understood as an 
extension of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, in which he argued that 
the Constitution was color-blind even as he affirmed the concept of 
white superiority.145  Those arguments refusing to distinguish between 
remedial uses of race and uses that subordinate or stigmatize are 
particularly problematic. 
The combination of the Supreme Court’s rulings and 
conservatives’ use of egalitarian rhetoric to protect white privilege has 
resulted in a variety of so-called “reverse discrimination” cases.  The 
complaints and dissatisfaction of white students denied admission to 
their colleges, universities, or law schools of choice are afforded 
judicial cognizance largely in relation to the rhetoric of equal 
protection.  Likewise, the programs receiving the complaints have 
been developed on equal protection grounds to stem the tide of 
privileging whites over concerns for diversity and racial justice. 
Defunis v. Odegaard146 and Bakke are among the early “white 
backlash” cases, but such challenges have continued virtually 
unabated.  Among other cases are suits against the University of 
Maryland at College Park, the Law School of the University of Texas, 
and the University of Michigan.147  It is striking that by upholding an 
affirmative action program of the University of Michigan Law School, 
O’Connor draws a distinction between education and other arenas, 
such as employment.148  This distinction affirms the benign use of 
race-conscious remedies to create diversity.  No opinion of the Court, 
however, has granted judicial solicitude to “societal discrimination” 
experienced by African Americans, which Powell discounted in Bakke. 
Undoubtedly, historians must stress the importance of the 
protection of individual rights, as emphasized in the decisions 
leading to Brown.149  Further, the LDF attorneys understood that 
within the judicial system there was a duty to seek remedies for those 
individuals deprived of constitutional rights.  Such an emphasis on 
individual rights, however, addressed neither the significance and 
legitimacy of group rights, as Morton Horwitz has argued, nor the 
rationale for white superiority, such as the Supreme Court would 
                                                          
 145. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 146. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
 147. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
 148. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39. 
 149. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (stressing 
the personal and individual nature of constitutional rights).  In 1950, ruling for 
Heman Sweatt, the Court reiterated that equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment was Sweatt’s “full constitutional right,” a right that was “personal and 
present.”  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950). 
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later provide in Loving v. Virginia.150  The LDF attorneys and allies 
shared the litigation campaign’s ultimate goal of eliminating racial 
segregation.  Yet the argument with which Houston began—the 
fundamental problem of white supremacy—became a negligible 
factor in the strategic equation.  The struggle to achieve 
desegregation was so consuming that neither time, energy, resources, 
or personnel could be devoted to strategic anticipation of the use of a 
subverted individual rights rationale.  While the Brown opinion 
emphasized psychology, individual harm, and individual rights, space 
remained for new rationales to buttress white privilege.  It took only a 
few more steps for some to discover how to simultaneously give lip-
service to principles of equality while sustaining white superiority.151 
The meaning of the struggle of African Americans is not 
diminished by some nefarious consequences growing out of the 
systemic nature of white supremacy.  Before adults and children 
faced fire hoses, freedom fighters faced COINTELPRO,152 and leaders 
faced assassinations, those enslaved risked all for freedom.  After 
1965, a newly-emancipated people continued to confront lynching, 
riots, and other unspeakable horrors.  In the context of a collective 
struggle, they demanded respect for their humanity, recognition of 
their equality, the right to full freedom, and the realization of a good 
and just society.  This had intrinsic value. 
As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of Brown, we ignore at our 
own peril Brown’s organic connection with the Black Freedom 
Movement intent upon achieving not only the liberation of African 
Americans, but also the transformation of society.  Neither can we 
                                                          
 150. Compare note 14 (observing in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) a 
failure to condemn white racism against African Americans), with Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 11-12 & n.11 (characterizing Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws not as 
measures promoting or restricting individual rights but rather as measures 
promoting White Supremacy by creating racially restrictive classifications), and 
Morton J. Horowitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, in HAVE 
WE OVERCOME: RACE RELATIONS SINCE BROWN 173, 184-86 (Michael V. Namorato ed., 
1979) (noting the U.S. legal system’s failure to examine discrimination against 
African Americans as a group).  Forced to litigate as individuals, African Americans 
are prohibited from introducing evidence of successive generations of oppression 
and the resulting economic and social disparities between blacks and whites.  Id. at 
185-86.  Litigants must instead overcome a far more difficult evidentiary hurdle: 
proving present governmental discriminatory intent.  Id. 
 151. See SEMONCHE, supra note 9, at 277; see also BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:  A 
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 34 (Waldo Martin ed., 1998) (noting the failure of 
the courts to acknowledge the correlation between racial and economic inequality); 
Carter, supra note 14, at 247. 
 152. See KENNETH O’REILLY, RACIAL MATTERS:  THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK 
AMERICA, 1960-1972 (1989) (discussing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
its “COINTELPRO” Counter Intelligence Program against African Americans in the 
Civil Rights and Black Power Movements). 
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fully comprehend the historical significance of Brown apart from the 
shaping forces of Houstonian Jurisprudence, pervasive white racism, 
and visions of a just, free, and democratic society.  Between 1934 and 
1954, struggles against racial discrimination and segregation 
intensified on many fronts, and local battles seemed to multiply 
exponentially.  Between 1950 and 1954, certain assumptions, with 
which Charles Hamilton Houston began and upon which Houston 
and non-NAACP activists relied for organizing the masses, either 
diminished in significance for the NAACP and the NAACP-LDF 
lawyers or were not deemed fundamental.  Among these, several 
assumptions about racial oppression, class relations, and the legal 
system’s limitations are particularly salient for those who seek to learn 
from history and continue the struggle for a free, just, and 
democratic society. 
The historical context of Brown highlights the movement towards 
direct action against segregation.  The first step was the initial 
articulation of group oppression and white supremacy as the 
rationale for racial segregation.  This was a part of Houston’s 
thinking in the 1930s, and Black nationalists and some political 
radicals recognized this reality.  Next, Houston, the political left, and 
community organizers urged that class loyalties and commitments of 
judges and other public officers—elected or appointed—be taken 
into account.  Houston, however, also stressed that action through 
the judicial system had its limitations.  Although he focused primarily 
on dismantling Plessy and attacking racial discrimination through 
litigation, Houston concurred in the assessment of activists that direct 
action must also be employed as a strategy in the struggle for 
freedom, equality, and justice.  While Thurgood Marshall led the 
LDF staff and NAACP-affiliated attorneys in initiatives limited to the 
judicial system, African Americans and interracial coalitions 
advocated and utilized direct action more widely after World War II.  
Concurrently with the development of case law leading to Brown and 
Bolling, the radical left was outspoken in identifying and condemning 
the use of both white supremacy and race-based economic 
discrimination to divide blacks and poor whites and prevent 
interracial class struggle. 
The Black Freedom Movement also expanded and garnered 
strength in the period leading up to Brown through grass-roots 
organizing within communities.  Organizers and leaders within 
communities prioritized needs and addressed economic well-being, 
an end to lynching, equal rights, a voice in the electoral process, and 
education.  Some black nationalists and non-nationalists promulgated 
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black self-determination by relating it to the struggles of oppressed 
peoples throughout the world.  As cases leading to Brown developed, 
youth as well as adults, whether leaders or followers, participated in 
the struggle for rights with a clear commitment to freedom and 
equality.  Their visions and dreams of the ideal American society 
differed.  These differences marked a wide range of hopes held by 
African Americans regarding democracy in the United States and 
radical social democracies. Leading African American freedom 
fighters and organizers grappled with these and other competing 
ideologies.  Both the government and the public victimized far too 
many civil rights advocates for their public engagement in critiquing 
the existing system in the United States.  Nonetheless, throughout 
the years preceding Brown and Bolling, African Americans and 
progressive white allies committed themselves to the physical and 
intellectual work of the struggle so that they might eventually offer a 
clear liberating vision. 
The political, social, cultural, and economic movements behind 
Brown and Bolling were dynamic and evolutionary, and throughout, 
the Black Freedom Movement continued.  Increasing numbers of 
Americans were willing to struggle in opposition to racial injustice.  
They envisioned a changed society—free, just, democratic, 
egalitarian—and they sought and fought for it, regardless of risks, 
threats, or fear.  I am reminded of Audre Lorde’s wise words, for 
fearlessness was never the issue or a requirement:  “When I dare to be 
powerful, to use my strength in the service of my vision, then it 
becomes less important whether or not I am unafraid.”153  Finally, the 
context for Brown and Bolling was the Black Freedom Movement “at 
its deepest levels . . . mov[ing] toward a freedom that liberates the 
whole person and humanizes the entire society.”154 
                                                          
 153. AUDRE LORDE, THE CANCER JOURNALS 15 (1980). 
 154. HARDING, supra note 15, at xxiv. 
